Make a Difference on July 12th

Bad Guys

These are the Senators and representatives that voted against Marriage Equality in 2004 that are still in office. Scroll down further to see who represents you in your own home town. If anyone makes my list that has changed their vote in favor of gay marriage, contact me immediately and their name will be removed from this list. Contact me at salemmaman@gmail.com for error corrections or additions.

SENATE:
*Stephen M. Brewer, D-Barre - Y
*Robert S. Creedon Jr., D-Brockton - Y
*John A. Hart Jr., D-Boston - Y
*Robert L. Hedlund, R-Weymouth - Y
*Richard T. Moore, D-Uxbridge - Y
*Michael W. Morrissey, D-Quincy - Y
*Marc R. Pacheco, D-Taunton - Y
*Steven C. Panagiotakos, D-Lowell - Y



HOUSE:
*Bruce J. Ayers, D-Quincy - Y
*John J. Binienda, D-Worcester - Y
*Garrett J. Bradley, D-Hingham - Y
*Arthur J. Broadhurst, D-Methuen - Y
*Jennifer M. Callahan, D-Sutton - Y
*Christine E. Canavan, D-Brockton - Y
*Gale D. Candaras, D-Wilbraham - Y
*Mark J. Carron, D-Southbridge - Y
*Paul C. Casey, D-Winchester - Y
*Edward G. Connolly, D-Everett - Y
*Michael J. Coppola, R-Foxboro - Y
*Robert Correia, D-Fall River - Y
*Geraldine Creedon, D-Brockton - Y
*Robert A. DeLeo, D-Winthrop - Y
*Viriato Manuel deMacedo, R-Plymouth - Y
*Brian S. Dempsey, D-Haverhill - Y
*Paul J. Donato, D-Medford - Y
*Joseph R. Driscoll, D-Braintree - Y
*Lewis G. Evangelidis, R-Holden - Y
*James H. Fagan, D-Taunton - Y
*David L. Flynn, D-Bridgewater - Y
*John P. Fresolo, D-Worcester - Y
*Paul K. Frost, R-Auburn - Y
*Susan W. Gifford, R-Wareham - Y
*Anne M. Gobi, D-Spencer - Y
*Emile J. Goguen, D-Fitchburg - Y
Brian Paul Golden, D-Boston - Y
*Thomas A. Golden Jr., D-Lowell - Y
*Shirley Gomes, R-South Harwich - Y
*William G. Greene Jr., D-Billerica - Y
*Geoffrey D. Hall, D-Westford - Y
*Robert S. Hargraves, R-Groton - Y
*Bradford Hill, R-Ipswich - Y
*Donald F. Humason Jr., R-Westfield - Y
*Frank M. Hynes, D-Marshfield - Y
*Bradley H. Jones Jr., R-North Reading - Y
*Michael F. Kane, D-Holyoke - Y
*Paul Kujawski, D-Webster - Y
*Stephen P. LeDuc, D-Marlboro - Y
*John A. Lepper, R-Attleboro - Y
*Paul J. Loscocco, R-Holliston - Y
*Ronald Mariano, D-Quincy - Did not vote
*James R. Miceli, D-Wilmington - Y
*James M. Murphy, D-Weymouth - Y
*David M. Nangle, D-Lowell - Y
*Harold P. Naughton Jr., D-Clinton - Y
*Robert J. Nyman, D-Hanover - Y
*Thomas J. O'Brien, D-Kingston - Y
*Eugene L. O'Flaherty, D-Chelsea - Y
*Shirley Owens-Hicks, D-Boston - Y
*Marie J. Parente, D-Milford - Y
*Jeffrey D. Perry, R-Sandwich - Y
*George N. Peterson Jr., R-Grafton - Y
*Thomas M. Petrolati, D-Ludlow - Y
*Elizabeth A. Poirier, R-North Attleboro - Y
*Karyn E. Polito, R-Shrewsbury - Y
*Susan W. Pope, R-Wayland - Y
*John F. Quinn, D-Dartmouth - Y
*Mary S. Rogeness, R-Longmeadow - Y
*John H. Rogers, D-Norwood - Y
*Michael F. Rush, D-Boston - Y
*Angelo M. Scaccia, D-Boston - Y
*Joyce A. Spiliotis, D-Peabody - Y
*Walter F. Timilty, D-Milton - Y
*A. Stephen Tobin, D-Quincy - Y
*Philip Travis, D-Rehoboth - Y
*James E. Vallee, D-Franklin - Y
*Anthony J. Verga, D-Gloucester - Y
*Joseph F. Wagner, D-Chicopee - Y
*Brian P. Wallace, D-Boston - Y
*Patricia A. Walrath, D-Stow - Y
*Daniel K. Webster, R-Hanson - Y


Here is who they represent:


A
Abington
Senator Michael W. Morrissey
Representative Kathleen M. Teahan
Acton
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Cory Atkins:- precincts one, two, and six
Representative James B. Eldridge:- precincts three, four, and five
Acushnet
Senator Mark C. Montigny
Representative Robert M. Koczera
Adams
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Agawam
Senator Stephen J. Buoniconti
Representative Daniel F. Keenan
Alford
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Amesbury
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Michael A. Costello
Amherst
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Ellen Story
Andover
Senator Susan C. Tucker
Representative Barry R. Finegold:- precincts two, three, five, four, six, and nine
Representative Barbara A. L'Italien:- precincts one, seven, and eight
Aquinnah
Senator Robert A. O'Leary
Representative Eric T. Turkington
Arlington
Senator Robert A. Havern
Representative Anne M. Paulsen:- precincts two and four
Representative J. James Marzilli, Jr.:- precincts one, three, five to thirteen, fifteen, sixteen, eighteen, and nineteen
Representative Jay R. Kaufman.:- precincts fourteen, seventeen, twenty, and twenty-one
Ashburnham
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
House Seat Vacant
Ashby
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
House Seat Vacant
Ashfield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Ashland
Senator Karen E. Spilka
Representative Tom Sannicandro
Athol
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Attleboro
Senator Scott P. Brown:-precincts one, two, three A
Senator James E. Timilty:-precinct three B
Representative John A. Lepper:-precincts one, two, and three A
Representative Elizabeth A. Poirier:-precinct three B
Auburn
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative Paul K. Frost
Avon
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative William C. Galvin
Ayer
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Robert S. Hargraves
B
Barnstable
Senator Robert O'Leary:-precincts one to nine, and thirteen
Senator Therese Murray:-precincts ten to twelve
Representative Demetrius J. Atsalis:- precincts one through four, six, eight, nine to thirteen
Representative Matthew Patrick :- precincts five and seven
Representative Jeffrey D. Perry:- precincts ten to twelve
Barre
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Becket
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Bedford
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Charles A. Murphy
Belchertown
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg :- precincts A and D
Senator Brian P. Lees:- precincts B and C
Representative Thomas M. Petrolati:- precincts Band C
Representative Stephen Kulik :- precinct A and D
Bellingham
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Jennifer M. Callahan
Belmont
Senator Steven A. Tolman
Representative Anne M. Paulsen
Berkley
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative David B. Sullivan
Berlin
Senator Harriete L. Chandler
Representative Stephen P. LeDuc
Bernardston
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Beverly
Senator Frederick E. Berry
Representative Mary E. Grant
Billerica
Senator Robert A. Havern
Representative William G. Greene, Jr.
Blackstone
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Jennifer M. Callahan
Blandford
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Bolton
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Patricia A. Walrath
Boston
Senator Robert E. Travaglini:- ward one precincts one to fourteen, ward three (precincts one to six) and ward five (precinct three)
Senator Jack Hart:-ward 1, precinct 15, wards 6, 7 and 13, ward 14, precincts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 12 to 14, inclusive, wards 15, 16 and 17, ward 18, precincts 1 to 6, inclusive, and 21
Senator Jarrett T. Barrios :- ward two (all precincts), ward twenty-one (precincts four, six, and seven) and ward twenty-two (precincts one, two, and five)
Representative Brian P. Wallace.:- ward six (all precincts), ward seven (precincts one to nine), and ward thirteen (precincts three and six)
Senator Dianne Wilkerson:- ward three (precincts seven and eight), ward four (precincts one to six, eight and nine), ward five (precincts one, four to eight, and eleven), ward eight (all precincts), ward nine (all precincts), ward ten (all precincts), ward eleven (all precincts), ward twelve (all precincts), ward fourteen (precincts three, six to eleven), and ward nineteen (precincts one to nine)
Senator Marian Walsh:- ward eighteen (precincts seven to twenty, twenty-two and twenty-three), ward nineteen (precincts ten, eleven to thirteen) and ward twenty (all precincts)
Senator Steven A. Tolman:- ward four (precincts seven and ten), ward twenty-one (precincts one to three, five and eight to sixteen) and ward twenty-two (precincts three, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen)
Representative Anthony Petruccelli:- ward one (all precincts) and the Boston HarborIslands
Representative Eugene L. O'Flaherty:- ward two (all precincts)
Representative Salvatore F. DiMasi:- ward three (precincts one to four and six to eight), ward four (precinct one), ward five (precinct one) and ward eight (precincts one, two and six)
Representative Byron Rushing:- ward four (precincts two, three, four, five, six and seven), ward five (precincts two and ten), and ward nine (precincts one, two and three)
Representative Gloria L. Fox:- ward four (precincts eight, nine and ten), ward eight (precincts three and four), ward nine (precincts four and five), ward eleven (precinct two and three), ward twelve (precincts one to five, eight and nine) and ward twenty-one (precinct one)
Representative Martha Marty Walz:- ward three (precinct five), and ward five (precincts three to nine and eleven)
Representative Brian Wallace:- ward six (all precincts), ward seven (precincts one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight and nine) and ward thirteen (precincts three and six)
Representative Marie P. St. Fleur :- ward seven (precinct ten), ward eight (precincts five and seven), ward twelve (precinct six), ward thirteen (precincts one, two, four, and five), ward fourteen (precincts one and four) and ward fifteen (precincts one, two three, four five, seven, eight and nine)
Representative Jeffery Sanchez:- ward ten (all precincts), ward eleven (precinct one) and ward nineteen (precincts one to five, and eight)
Representative Elizabeth A. Malia:- ward eleven (precincts four to ten), ward twelve (precinct seven), ward nineteen (precincts six, seven, nine to thirteen), and ward twenty (precincts one, two and four)
Representative Martin J. Walsh:- ward thirteen (precincts seven, eight, nine and ten), ward fifteen (precinct six), ward sixteen (precincts one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, nine, and ten) and ward seventeen (precincts two, three, six and nine)
Representative Shirley Owens-Hicks:- ward fourteen (precincts two, three, five to fourteen), ward seventeen (precincts one, five, seven eight, and ten), and ward eighteen (precinct three)
Representative Linda Dorcena Forry :- ward sixteen (precincts eight, eleven, and twelve), ward seventeen (precincts four, eleven, twelve, thirteen and fourteen) and ward eighteen (precincts one, two, four, five, six and twenty-one)
Representative Angelo M. Scaccia:- ward eighteen (precincts seven to twenty, twenty-two and twenty-three)
Representative Michael F. Rush:- ward twenty (precincts three, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty)
Representative Kevin G. Honan:- ward twenty-one (precincts three, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven and twelve) and ward twenty-two (precincts two, three, six, nine and ten)
Representative Michael Moran:- ward twenty-one (precincts two, four, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen) and ward twenty-two (precincts one, four, five, seven, eight, eleven, twelve and thirteen)
Bourne
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Susan W. Gifford:- precincts one to three
Representative Matthew Patrick:- precincts five and six
Representative Jeffrey D. Perry:- precinct four
Boxborough
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative James B. Eldridge
Boxford
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradford Hill:- precincts one and three
Representative Barbara L'Italien :- precinct two
Boylston
Senator Harriette L. Chandler
Representative Harold P. Naughton, Jr.
Braintree
Senator Michael W. Morrissey:- precincts two, six to twelve
Senator Brian A. Joyce :- precincts two, six to twelve
Representative Joseph R. Driscoll :- precincts one, three, four and five
Brewster
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Cleon H. Turner
Bridgewater
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative David L. Flynn
Brimfield
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Brockton
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr..
Representative Geraldine Creedon:- ward one (precincts A and C), ward two (precinct A) and ward seven (all precincts)
Representative Thomas P. Kennedy:- ward one (precincts B and D), ward two (precincts B, C and D), ward three (all precincts) and ward four (precincts A and D), ward five (precinct A)
Representative Christine E. Canavan:- ward four (precincts B andC), ward 5 (precincts B, C and D) and ward six (all precincts)
Brookfield
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Brookline
Senator Cynthia Stone Creem
Representative Jeffrey Sanchez :- precincts five and fourteen
Representative Frank Israel Smizik:- precincts two to four, and six to thirteen
Representative Michael J. Moran:- precinct one
Representative Michael F. Rush:- precincts fifteen and sixteen
Buckland
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Burlington
Senator Robert A. Havern
Representative Charles A. Murphy
C
Cambridge
Senate President Robert E. Travaglini:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (all precincts), ward three (precincts one and three), ward four (all precincts), ward five (all precincts) and ward eight (precinct three)
Senator Jarrett T. Barrios:- ward three (precinct two), ward six (all precincts), ward seven (all precincts), ward eight (precincts one and two), ward nine (precinct one) and ward ten (precinct two)
Senator Steven A. Tolman:- ward nine (precincts two and three), ward ten (precincts one and three) and ward eleven (all precincts)
Representative Timothy J. Toomey, Jr.:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (precinct one) ward three (precincts one and two), and ward six (precinct one)
Representative Byron Rushing:- ward two (precinct two)
Representative Martha Marty Walz:- ward two (precinct three), ward three (precinct three), and ward five (all precincts)
Representative Alice K. Wolf:- ward four (all precincts), ward six (precincts two and three), ward seven (all precincts), ward eight (all precincts), and ward ten (precincts one and two)
Representative Rachel Kaprielian:- ward nine (all precincts)
Representative Anne M. Paulsen:- ward ten (precinct three) and ward eleven (all precincts)
Canton
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative William C. Galvin
Carlisle
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Cory Atkins
Carver
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative Susan Williams Gifford
Charlemont
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Charlton
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Mark J. Carron
Chatham
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Chelmsford
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Cory Atkins :- precincts one and nine
Representative T. Golden :- precincts two, six, and eight
Representative G. Hall :- precincts three, five, and seven
Representative D. Nangle :-precinct four
Chelsea
Senator Jarret T. Barrios
Representative Eugene L. O'Flaherty: wards one and two, ward three (precincts one and three), ward four (precincts one and four)
Representative Kathi-Anne Reinstein:- ward three (precincts two and four), ward four (precincts two and three)
Cheshire
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Chester
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Chesterfield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
Chicopee
Senator Michael R. Knapik:- ward one, three, and six to nine
Senator Stephen J. Buoniconti:- ward two (all precincts), ward four (all precincts) and ward five (all precincts)
Representative Joseph F. Wagner:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (precincts A, C and D), ward three (all precincts), ward six (precinct A), ward seven (all precincts), ward eight (all precincts) and ward nine (all precincts)
Representative Sean Curran:- ward five (precinct A)
Representative James T. Welch:- ward two (precinct B), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precinct B)
Representative Thomas M. Petrolati:- ward six (precinct B)
Chilmark
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Clarksburg
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Clinton
Senator Harriette L. Chandler :- precinct three and four
Senator Robert A. Antonioni :- precinct one and two
Representative Harold P. Naughton, Jr. :- all precincts
Cohasset
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Garrett J. Bradley
Colrain
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Concord
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Cory Atkins
Conway
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
Cummington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
D
Dalton
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Danvers
Senator Frederick E. Berry
Representative Theodore C. Speliotis
Dartmouth
Senator Mark C. Montigny
Representative John F. Quinn
Dedham
Senator Marian Walsh
Representative Robert K. Coughlin
Deerfield
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Dennis
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Cleon H. Turner
Dighton
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative Patricia A. Haddad
Douglas
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Paul Kujawski
Dover
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Lida E. Harkins
Dracut
Senator Susan C. Tucker
Representative Colleen M. Garry
Dudley
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Paul Kujawski
Dunstable
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Robert S. Hargraves
Duxbury
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Daniel K. Webster :-precincts two to five
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien :-precincts one and six
E
East Bridgewater
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr. :- precincts one to three
Senator Brian A. Joyce. :- precinct four
Representative Kathleen M. Teahan
East Brookfield
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Mark J. Carron
East Longmeadow
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Gale D. Candaras:- precincts one and two
Representative Mary S. Rogeness:- precincts three and four
Eastham
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Easthampton
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative John W. Scibak
Easton
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr.:- precincts one and two
Senator Brian A. Joyce :- precincts three to six
Representative Geraldine Creedon:- precincts one, two, four and five
Representative David L. Flynn:- precinct six
Representative Christine E. Canavan:- precinct three
Edgartown
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Egremont
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Erving
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Essex
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Anthony J. Verga
Everett
Senator Jarret T. Barrios
Representative Edward G. Connolly
F
Fairhaven
Senator Mark C. Montigny
Representative William M. Straus
Fall River
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative Michael J. Rodrigues:- ward one (precinct A), ward five (precincts B and C), ward six (all precincts), ward seven (precinct B) and ward eight (precinct A)
Representative Robert Correia:- ward one (precincts B, C and D), ward two (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward four (precincts A and B) and ward five (precinct A)
Representative David B. Sullivan:- ward four (precinct C), ward seven (precincts A, C and D), ward eight (precincts B, C and D) and ward nine (all precincts)
Falmouth
Senator Therese Murray:- all precincts
Representative Eric Turkington:- precincts one, two, five and six
Representative Matthew Patrick:- precincts three, four, seven, eight and nine
Fitchburg
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Emile J. Goguen
Florida
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Foxborough
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Virginia M. Coppola
Framingham
Senator Karen E. Spilka
Representative Deborah D. Blumer:- precincts one through seven, nine, thirteen, fourteen and seventeen
Representative Tom Sannicandro:- precincts eight, eleven, twelve, fifteen, sixteen and eighteen
Franklin
Senator Karen E. Spilka :- (precincts one and five to eight)
Senator Scott P. Brown:- (precincts two to four)
Representative James E. Vallee
Freetown
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative David B. Sullivan:- precinct one
Representative John F. Quinn:- precinct two
Representative Stephen R. Canessa:- precinct three
G
Gardner
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Robert L. Rice Jr.
Georgetown
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Harriett L. Stanley:- precinct one
Representative Barbara L'Italien :- precinct two
Gill
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Gloucester
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Anthony J. Verga
Goshen
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
Gosnold
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Grafton
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative George N. Peterson, Jr.
Granby
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Ellen Stony
Granville
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Daniel F. Keenan
Great Barrington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Greenfield
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Groton
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Robert S. Hargraves
Groveland
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Harriett L. Stanley
H
Hadley
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative John W. Scibak
Halifax
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr..
Representative Daniel K. Webster :- precinct two
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien:- precinct one
Hamilton
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradford Hill
Hampden
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Mary S. Rogeness
Hancock
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Hanover
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr..
Representative Robert J. Nyman
Hanson
Senator Robert S. Creedon. Jr.
Representative Daniel K. Webster
Hardwick
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Harvard
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative James B. Eldridge
Harwich
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Hatfield
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Peter V. Kocot
Haverhill
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Barbara L'Italien :-ward two (precinct one and two, ward five (precinct two) and ward seven (precinct two)
Representative Brian S. Dempsey:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (precinct three), ward three (all precincts), ward four (precincts one and two), ward five (precincts one and three) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative Harriett L. Stanley:- ward four (precinct three) and ward seven (precincts one and three)
Hawley
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Heath
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Hingham
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Garrett J. Bradley
Hinsdale
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Holbrook
Senator Michael W. Morrissey
Representative Joseph R. Driscoll:- precinct one
Representative Ronald Mariano:- precincts two to four
Holden
Senator Harriette L. Chandler
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
Holland
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Holliston
Senator Karen E. Spilka
Representative Paul J. P. Loscocco
Holyoke
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Michael F. Kane
Hopedale
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Marie J. Parente
Hopkinton
Senator Karen E. Spilka
Representative Paul J. P. Loscocco
Hubbardston
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
Hudson
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Patricia A. Walrath
Hull
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Garrett J. Bradley
Huntington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
I
Ipswich
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradford Hill
K
Kingston
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien
L
Lakeville
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative John F. Quinn:- precinct one
Representative Stephen R. Canessa:- precincts two and three
Lancaster
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative James B. Eldridge:- precinct one
Representative Harold P. Naughton, Jr.:- precinct two
Lanesborough
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Lawrence
Senator Susan C. Tucker
Representative David M. Torrisi:- ward A (precincts one and three), ward E (precincts 2 and 3) and ward F (precincts one, two and four)
Representative William Lantigua:- ward A (precincts two and four), ward B (all precincts), ward C (all precincts), ward D (precincts 3 and 4) and ward F (precinct 3)
Representative Barry R. Finegold:- ward D (precincts one and two) and ward E (precincts one and four)
Lee
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Leicester
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative John J. Binienda
Lenox
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Leominster
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Jennifer L. Flanagan
Leverett
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Lexington
Senator Robert A. Havern:- precincts one, two, and four to seven
Senator Susan C. Fargo:- precincts three, eight and nine
Representative Jay R. Kaufman :- precincts one and five to nine
Representative Thomas M. Stanley :- precincts two to four
Leyden
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Lincoln
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Susan W. Pope
Littleton
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Geoffrey D. Hall
Longmeadow
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Mary S. Rogeness
Lowell
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Thomas A. Golden, Jr.:- ward five (all precincts), ward six (all precincts) and ward nine (all precincts)
Representative David M. Nangle:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (precinct three), ward four (precincts two and three), ward ten (all precincts) and ward eleven (all precincts)
Representative Kevin J. Murphy:- ward two (precincts one and two), ward three (all precincts), ward four (precinct one), ward seven (all precincts) and ward eight (all precincts)
Ludlow
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Thomas M. Petrolati
Lunenburg
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative James B. Eldridge
Lynn
Senator Thomas M. McGee
Representative Mark V. Falzone:- ward one (precincts one and two)
Representative Robert F. Fennell:- ward one (precincts three and four), ward two (all precincts), ward three (precincts one, two and three), ward four (precincts one to three) and ward five (precinct five)
Representative Douglas W. Petersen:- ward three (precinct four)
Representative Steven Myles Walsh:- ward five (precincts one, two and four), ward six (all precincts) and ward seven (all precincts)
Lynnfield
Senator Richard R. Tisei
Representative Bradley H. Jones, Jr.:- precincts one, three and four
Representative Mark V. Falzone:- precinct two
M
Malden
Senator Richard R. Tisei
Representative Christopher G. Fallon:- ward two (all precincts), ward three (precinct one), ward four (all precincts), ward five (all precincts), ward six (all precincts) and ward eight (all precincts)
Representative Edward G. Connolly:- ward seven (precinct two)
Representative Paul J. Donato:- ward one (all precincts), ward three (precinct two), and ward seven (precinct one)
Manchester-by-the-Sea
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradford Hill
Mansfield
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Virginia M. Coppola precincts one, three and six
Representative Elizabeth Poirier :-precincts two and five
Representative Louis L. Kafka:- precinct four
Marblehead
Senator Thomas McGee
Representative Douglas W. Petersen
Marion
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative William M. Straus
Marlborough
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Stephen P. LeDuc
Marshfield
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Frank M. Hynes
Mashpee
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Matthew Patrick :- precincts two, four and five
Representative Jeffrey D. Perry :- precincts one and three
Mattapoisett
Senator Mark C. Montigny
Representative William M. Straus
Maynard
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Patricia A. Walrath
Medfield
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Lida E. Harkins:- precincts one and two
Representative Richard J. Ross:- precincts three and four
Medford
Senator Patricia D. Jehlen
Representative Paul J. Donato:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (all precincts), ward three (precinct one), ward seven (precinct two) and ward eight (precinct one)
Representative J. James Marzilli, Jr.:- ward three (precinct two) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative Carl M. Sciortino, Jr.:- ward four (all precincts), ward five (all precincts), ward seven (precinct one) and ward eight (precinct two)
Medway
Senator Karen E. Spilka
Representative Paul J. P. Loscocco :- precinct one
Representative James E. Vallee :- precincts two to four
Melrose
Senator Richard R. Tisei :- wards one to five
Senator Thomas M. McGee :- wards six and seven
Representative Michael E. Festa
Mendon
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Marie J. Parente
Merrimac
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Harriett L. Stanley
Methuen
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Arthur J. Broadhurst:- precincts one to six, eight to twelve
Representative Barbara A. L'Italen:- precinct seven
Middleborough
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien:- precincts one and five
Representative William M. Straus:- precincts three and six
Representative Stephen R. Canessa:- precincts two and four
Middlefield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Middleton
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradley H. Jones :-precinct one
Representative Bradford R. Hill:-precinct two
Milford
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Marie J. Parente
Millbury
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative Paul K. Frost
Millis
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Richard J. Ross:- precinct one
Representative David Paul Linsky:- precincts two and three
Millville
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Jennifer M. Callahan
Milton
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative Walter F. Timilty:- precincts one, two, four, five, eight, nine, ten, eleven
Linda Dorcena Forry:- precinct three, six and seven
Monroe
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Monson
Stephen M. Brewer
Mary S. Rogeness
Montague
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Monterey
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Montgomery
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Peter V. Kocot
Mount Washington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
N
Nahant
Senator Thomas M. McGee
Senator Steven Myles Walsh
Nantucket
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Natick
Senator Karen E. Spilka:- precincts one, two, three, four, five and eight
Senator Scott P. Brown:- precincts six, seven, nine and ten
Representative David Paul Linsky :- precincts one to nine
Representative Alice Hanlon Peisch :- precinct ten
Needham
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Lida E. Harkins
Needham
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Lida E. Harkins
New Ashford
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
New Bedford
Senator Mark C. Montigny
Representative Robert M. Koczera:- ward one (precincts A to E) and ward two (all precincts)
Representative Stephen R. Canessa:- ward one (precincts F and G), ward three (precincts A to E), and ward four (precincts D and E)
Representative Antonio F. D. Cabral:- ward four (precincts A to C, F and G), ward five (all precincts) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative John F. Quinn:- ward three (precincts F and G)
New Braintree
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
New Marlborough
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
New Salem
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Newbury
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Harriett L. Stanley
Newburyport
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Michael A. Costello
Newton
Senator Cynthia Stone Creem
Representative Ruth B. Balser:- ward five (precincts one and three), ward six (all precincts), ward seven (precinct one, three and four) and ward eight (all precincts)
Representative Peter J. Koutoujian:- ward one (precincts one and four) and ward three (precinct four)
Representative Kay Khan:- ward one (precinct two and three), ward two (all precincts), ward three (precincts one and two), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precinct four) and ward seven (precinct two)
Norfolk
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Richard J. Ross
North Adams
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
North Andover
Senator Steven A. Baddour:- precincts one, four, six and eight
Senator Bruce E. Tarr:- precincts two, three, five and seven
Representative David M. Torrisi:- precincts one to six
Representative Barbara A. L'Italien. :- precincts seven and eight
North Attleborough
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Elizabeth Poirier
North Brookfield
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representatvie Anne M. Gobi
North Reading
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradley H. Jones, Jr.
Northampton
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Peter V. Kocot
Northborough
Senator Pamela P. Resor :- precinct three
Senator Harriette L. Chandler :- precincts one, two and four
Representative Harold P. Naughton, Jr.
Northbridge
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative George N. Peterson, Jr.
Northfield
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Norton
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Philip Travis :- precinct one
Representative Elizabeth Poirer :- precinct two
Representative Virginia M. Coppola :- precincts three, four and five
Norwell
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Robert J. Nyman
Norwood
Senator Marian Walsh
Representative John H. Rogers
O
Oak Bluffs
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Oakham
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
Orange
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Orleans
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Otis
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Oxford
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Paul K. Frost:- precincts one and three
Representative Mark J. Carron:- precinct two
Representative Paul Kujawski :- precinct four
P
Palmer
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Paxton
Senator Harriette L. Chandler
Representative Robert Spellane
Peabody
Senator Frederick E. Berry
Representative Joyce A. Spiliotis: wards one, two, three, four and five
Representative Theodore C. Speliotis:- ward six
Pelham
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Pembroke
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Daniel K. Webster
Pepperell
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Robert S. Hargraves
Peru
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Petersham
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Phillipston
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Pittsfield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Christopher Speranzo:- ward one (precinct A), ward two (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward four(all precincts), ward five (precinct A), ward six (all precincts) and ward seven (all precincts)
Representative Denis E. Guyer:- ward one (precinct B)
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli:- ward five (precinct B)
Plainfield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Plainville
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Richard J. Ross
Plymouth
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Vinny M. deMacedo:- precincts two through ten, twelve, and fourteen
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien:- precincts one, eleven and thirteen
Plympton
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Thomas J. O'Brien
Princeton
Senator Harriette L. Chandler
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
Provincetown
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Q
Quincy
Senator Michael W. Morrissey
Representative A. Stephen Tobin:- ward one (all precincts), ward three (precincts one, two and five), ward four (precincts two and four) and ward five (precincts one, three and four)
Representative Ronald Mariano:- ward two (all precincts) and ward four (precinct five)
Representative Bruce J. Ayers:- ward three (precincts three and four), ward four (precincts one and three), ward five (precincts two and five) and ward six (all precincts)
R
Randolph
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative Joseph R. Driscoll:- precinct three
Representative Walter F. Timilty:- precincts one, two, four, seven and eight
Representative Bruce J. Ayers:- precincts five and six
Raynham
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative David L. Flynn
Reading
Senator Richard R. Tisei
Representative Bradley H. Jones, Jr.:- precincts one, four, six, seven, eight
Representative Patrick M. Natale:- precincts two, three and five
Rehoboth
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Philip Travis
Revere
Senator President Robert E. Travaglini ward one, two, three, four, five
Senator Jarrett T. Barrios - ward six
Representative Kathi-Ann Reinstein:- ward one (precinct three), ward three (precinct one), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precincts one and two) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative Robert A. DeLeo:- ward one (precincts one and two), ward two (all precincts), ward three (precincts two and three) and ward five (precinct three)
Richmond
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Rochester
Senator Joan M.Menard
Representative William M. Straus
Rockland
Senator Michael W. Morrissey
Representative Robert J. Nyman
Rockport
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Anthony J. Verga
Rowe
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Rowley
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Harriett L. Stanley
Royalston
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
House Seat Vacant
Russell
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Daniel F. Keenan
Rutland
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
S
Salem
Senator Frederick E. Berry
Representative John D. Keenan
Salisbury
Senator Steven A. Baddour
Representative Michael A. Costello
Sandisfield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Sandwich
Senator Therese Murray
Representative Jeffrey D. Perry
Saugus
Senator Thomas M. McGee :- precincts one, three, four, five, seven, eight and nine
Senate Jarrett T. Barrios:- precincts two, six and ten
Representative Mark V. Falzone :- precincts one, two, four to nine
Representative Kathi Ann Reinslein :- precincts three and ten
Savoy
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Scituate
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative Frank M. Hynes :- precinct one, two, four, five and six
Representative Garrett J. Bradley :- precinct three
Seekonk
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative Philip Travis
Sharon
Senator James E. Timilty :- precincts one four, and five
Senator Brian A. Joyce :- precincts two and three
Representative Louis L. Kafka
Sheffield
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Shelburne
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Sherborn
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative David Paul Linsky
Shirley
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative James B. Eldridge
Shrewsbury
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative Karyn E. Polito
Shutesbury
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Somerset
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative Patricia A. Haddad
Somerville
Senator Jarrett T. Barrios:- ward one (precinct one) and ward two (precinct one)
Senator Patricia D. Jehlen:- ward one (precincts two and three), ward two (precincts two and three), ward three (all precincts), ward four (all precincts), ward five (all precincts), ward six (all precincts) and ward seven (all precincts)
Representative Timothy J. Toomey, Jr.:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (precincts one and two)
Representative Denise Provost:- ward two (precinct three), ward three (all precincts), ward four (precinct three), ward five (all precincts) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative Carl M. Sciortino, Jr.:- ward four (precincts one and two) and ward seven (all precincts)
South Hadley
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative John W. Scibak
Southampton
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Peter V. Kocot
Southborough
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Paul J. P. Loscocco :- precincts two and three
Representative Stephen P. LeDuc :- precinct one
Southbridge
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Mark J. Carron
Southwick
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Daniel F. Keenan
Spencer
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi :- precincts two and three
Representative Mark J. Carron :- precincts one and four
Springfield
Senator Stephen J. Buoniconti:- ward one (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precincts A and B) and ward six (all precincts)
Senator Brian P. Lees:- ward two (all precincts), ward five (precincts C, D, E, F, G and H), ward seven (all precincts) and ward eight (all precincts)
Representative Mary S. Rogeness:- ward six (precincts B and C)
Representative Sean Curran:- ward two (A, B, C, D, F, G and H), ward five (precincts C, D, G and H), ward 7 (precinct H) and ward eight (precincts A, B, D and H)
Representative Cheryl A. Rivera:- ward one (all precincts), ward three (precincts B, C, F, G and H) and ward six (precincts A, E and G)
Representative Benjamin Swan:- ward three (precincts A, D and E), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precincts A, B, E and F) and ward seven (precinct A), ward 8 (precinct C)
Representative Gale D. Candaras:- ward six (precincts D, F and H) and ward seven (precincts B, C, D, E, F and G)
Representative James T. Welch: ward 2 (precinct E)
Representative Thomas M. Petrolati: ward 8 (precincts E, F and G)
Sterling
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis :- precinct 1
Representative Harold P. Naughton, Jr. :- precinct 2
Stockbridge
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Stoneham
Senator Richard R. Tisei
Representative Paul C. Casey:- precincts one, two, four, five, six and seven
Representative Patrick M. Natale:- precincts three
Stoughton
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative William C. Galvin:- precinct one, five, seven and eight
Representative Louis L. Kafka:- precincts two, three, four and six
Stow
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Patricia A. Walrath
Sturbridge
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Sudbury
Senator Susan C. Fargo :- precincts one and four
Senator Pamela P. Resor :- precints two, three, and five
Representative Susan W. Pope
Sunderland
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Sutton
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Jennifer M. Callahan :- precincts one and two
Representative Paul K. Frost :- precinct three
Swampscott
Senator Thomas M. McGee
Representative Douglas W. Petersen
Swansea
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative Philip Travis:- precincts one, three, four and five
Representative Patricia A. Haddad :- precinct two
T
Taunton
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative James H. Fagan:- ward one (precinct B), ward two (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward five (all precincts), ward seven (all precincts) and ward eight (all precincts)
Representative Patricia A. Haddad:- ward one (precinct A), ward four (precinct B) and ward six (all precincts)
Representative Stephen R. Canessa:- ward four (precinct A)
Templeton
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
Tewksbury
Senator Susan C. Tucker
Representative Barry R. Finegold :- precinct three and three-A
Representative James R. Miceli:- precincts one, one-A, two, two-A, four and four-A
Tisbury
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Tolland
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
Topsfield
Senator Frederick E. Berry
Representative Theodore C. Speliotis
Townsend
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Robert S. Hargraves
Truro
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Tyngsborough
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Colleen M. Garry
Tyringham
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
U
Upton
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.
Representative George N. Peterson, Jr.
Uxbridge
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Paul Kujawski:- precinct three
Representative Jennifer M. Callahan:- precincts one, two and four
W
Wakefield
Senator Richard R. Tisei
Representative Mark V. Falzone:- precincts one, two and seven
Representative Michael E. Festa:- precincts three, four, five and six
Wales
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Walpole
Senator James E. Timilty
Representative John H. Rogers:- precincts one, two, six and seven
Representative Louis L. Kafka:- precincts three and four
Representative Richard J. Ross:- precinct five
Representative Robert K. Coughlin:- precinct eight

Waltham
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Thomas M. Stanley:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward four (all precincts) and ward seven (precinct one)
Representative Peter J. Koutoujian:- ward five (all precincts), ward six (all precincts), ward seven (precinct 2), ward eight (all precincts) and ward nine (all precincts)
Ware
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola:- precincts B and C
Representative Anne M. Gobi:- precinct A
Wareham
Senator Marc R. Pacheco
Representative Susan Williams Gifford
Warren
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Todd M. Smola
Warwick
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Christopher J. Donelan
Washington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Watertown
Senator Steven A. Tolman
Representative Rachel Kaprielian:- precincts one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, eleven and twelve
Representative Peter J. Koutoujian:- precinct ten
Wayland
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Susan W. Pope
Webster
Senator Richard T. Moore
Representative Paul Kujawski
Wellesley
Senator Cynthia Stone Creem:- precincts A, C, D and E
Senator Scott P. Brown:- precincts B, F and G
Representative Alice Hanlon Peisch
Wellfleet
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Shirley Gomes
Wendell
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Wenham
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Bradford Hill
West Boylston
Senator Harriette L. Chandler
Representative James B. Leary:
West Bridgewater
Senator Brian A. Joyce
Representative Christine E. Canavan
West Brookfield
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
Representative Anne M. Gobi
West Newbury
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative Harriett L. Stanley
West Springfield
Senator Stephen J. Buoniconti
Representative James T. Welch
West Stockbridge
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative William Smitty Pignatelli
West Tisbury
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Eric Turkington
Westborough
Senator Pamela P. Resor
Representative Karyn E. Polito:- precincts one and four
Representative Paul J.D. Loscocco:- precinct two
Representative George N. Peterson, Jr.:- precincts three and five
Westfield
Senator Michael R. Knapik
Representative Donald F. Humason, Jr.
Westford
Senator Steven C. Panagiotakos
Representative Geoffrey D. Hall
Westhampton
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Peter V. Kocot
Westminster
Senator Robert A. Antonioni
Representative Lewis G. Evangelidis
Weston
Senator Susan C. Fargo
Representative Alice Hanlon Peisch
Westport
Senator Joan M. Menard
Representative Michael J. Rodrigues
Westwood
Senator Marian Walsh
Representative Robert K. Coughlin
Weymouth
Senator Robert L. Hedlund
Representative James M. Murphy:- precincts one, two, three, four, seven, eight, ten, eleven, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, seventeen and eighteen
Representative Ronald Mariano:- precincts five, six, nine, twelve, sixteen
Whately
Senator Stanley C. Rosenberg
Representative Stephen Kulik
Whitman
Senator Robert S. Creedon, Jr..
Representative Kathleen M. Teahan
Wilbraham
Senator Brian P. Lees
Representative Gale D. Candaras
Williamsburg
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
Williamstown
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Daniel E. Bosley
Wilmington
Senator Bruce E. Tarr
Representative James R. Miceli:- precincts one, two, four, five and six
Representative Charles A. Murphy:- precinct three
Winchendon
Senator Stephen M. Brewer
House Seat Vacant
Winchester
Senator Patricia D. Jehlen
Representative Paul C. Casey
Windsor
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Denis E. Guyer
Winthrop
Senator Robert E. Travaglini
Representative Robert A. DeLeo
Woburn
Senator Robert A. Havern:- wards one, three, four, five, six and seven
Senator Patricia D. Jehlen:- ward two
Representative Patrick M. Natale:- precincts two, three, four, five and six
Representative Jay R. Kaufman:- precincts one and seven
Worcester
Senator Harriette L. Chandler:- ward one (all precincts), ward two (all precincts), ward three (all precincts), ward four (all precincts), ward nine (all precincts) and ward ten (all precincts)
Senator Edward M. Augustus, Jr.:- ward five (all precincts), ward six (all precincts), ward seven (all precincts) and ward eight (all precincts)
Representative Robert P. Spellane:- ward one (precincts one, two, three and four), ward nine (all precincts), and ward ten (precinct three)
Representative James B. Leary:- ward one (precinct five), ward two (all precincts) and ward three (precincts one, three and five)
Representative Vincent A. Pedone:- ward three (precincts two and four), ward four (all precincts), ward five (precinct three) and ward ten (precincts one, two, four and five)
Representative John P. Fresolo:- ward five (precincts one, two, four and five), ward six (all precincts) and ward eight (precincts one and five)
Representative John J. Binienda:- ward seven (all precincts) and ward eight (precincts two and four)
Worthington
Senator Andrea F. Nuciforo, Jr.
Representative Stephen Kulik
Wrentham
Senator Scott P. Brown
Representative Richard J. Ross
Y
Yarmouth
Senator Robert O'Leary
Representative Cleon H. Turner:- precincts one, two, four and seven
Representative Demetrius J. Atsalis:- precincts three, five and six

Bayard Rustin, The Gay Man Behind MLK

A comment from a reader named John made me post this:

http://www.rustin.org/about.html



Bayard Rustin

A master strategist and tireless activist, Bayard Rustin is best remembered as the organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, one of the largest nonviolent protests ever held in the United States. He brought Gandhi’s protest techniques to the American civil rights movement, and helped mold Martin Luther King, Jr. into an international symbol of peace and nonviolence.

Despite these achievements, Rustin was silenced, threatened, arrested, beaten, imprisoned and fired from important leadership positions, largely because he was an openly gay man in a fiercely homophobic era. Five years in the making and the winner of numerous awards, BROTHER OUTSIDER presents a feature-length documentary portrait, focusing on Rustin’s activism for peace, racial equality, economic justice and human rights.

Today, the United States is still struggling with many of the issues Bayard Rustin sought to change during his long, illustrious career. His focus on civil and economic rights and his belief in peace, human rights and the dignity of all people remain as relevant today as they were in the 1950s and 60s.

Rustin’s biography is particularly important for lesbian and gay Americans, highlighting the major contributions of a gay man to ending official segregation in America. Rustin stands at the confluence of the great struggles for civil, legal and human rights by African-Americans and lesbian and gay Americans. In a nation still torn by racial hatred and violence, bigotry against homosexuals, and extraordinary divides between rich and poor, his eloquent voice is needed today.

In February 1956, when Bayard Rustin arrived in Montgomery to assist with the nascent bus boycott, Martin Luther King, Jr. had not personally embraced nonviolence. In fact, there were guns inside King’s house, and armed guards posted at his doors. Rustin persuaded boycott leaders to adopt complete nonviolence, teaching them Gandhian nonviolent direct protest.

Apart from his career as an activist, Rustin the man was also fun-loving, mischievous, artistic, gifted with a fine singing voice, and known as an art collector who sometimes found museum-quality pieces in New York City trash. Historian John D’Emilio calls Rustin the "lost prophet" of the civil rights movement.


A Biography of Bayard Rustin
by Walter Naegle

The Winds of Change

May 17, 2006 was the two year anniversary of marriage equality in Massachusetts. Tom Lang, his husband Alex and others gathered at the state house steps to hold a sign thanking, and reminding the people of this commonwealth of the responsibility to be ever vigilant in the struggle for freedom.

This fight has never been about marriage, it was always about prejudice against gays and lesbians. The arguments against discrimination have been played out on KnowThyNeighbor.org to their fullest, and go ignored and unanswered by the opposition to equality.

Some have said that gays should not be allowed to get married because it is against God. Citizens of the United States are given freedom of choice in religion, and because our citizenship is so very diverse we protect those choices. Laws are not to include religious bias, so that one group cannot have control over another, and we can keep the delicate balance that protects all of us from having to defend our beliefs.

One of those beliefs is not to believe. Atheism is a belief of some, and while I don't follow that belief I am left with a question pertinent to the argument over gay marriage. If you don't believe in God, why would you be held to believe by the law? The Christian right has bullied its way into the government, and one of the first things it has done is go after people's ability to choose paths that conflict with their beliefs. By putting into law that civil marriage is between a man and a woman our government would be saying to its citizens that they have to accept God as a reality in their lives whether they want to or not. That is not acceptable. Once this Pandora's box is open it will be hard to define where our limits should then be.

Thomas Jefferson, in his 1st inaugural address in 1801 said, "Although the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable. The minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression". Again and again this same sentiment is repeated in our constitutions throughout our states, all people are created equal, and given the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Happiness for some is the choice to enter a same sex relationship, marriage, and have families. How important should the opinions of others be in this decision? The evidence suggests that morality is too subjective a matter for government to control or regulate. This is where this argument should end.

Our country has been made great by being free and by learning from our individualities. Ending marriage equality our society sends a clear message of hate to our children and the rest of the world. It implies that sometimes hate is OK, and we have nothing to gain from the gay community. The great majority of our country has not educated itself on this subject, but they are beginning to. The religious right and their allies against marriage equality do not simply want to end gay marriage, they want to put the gay community back in the closet. It is so very important to make that distinction so that we can see clearly their homophobic agenda. As people begin to see what is going on and understand what is at stake, I stand proudly with the winds of change at my back, welcoming the social progress our forefathers knew we had in us.

One day we will have a country that prides itself on social equality for all, not just the majority, and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s dream will be fulfilled.

Is Marriage a Right?

Marriage is centered around a choice. Two individuals meet, court, and decide to wed. The actual marriage, whether it is religiously based or civilly based requires the willingness of each individual. In a civil marriage, the two individuals consent to the marriage by signing a contract. In a religious marriage (Roman Catholic is used in this example) the individuals are each asked if they consent to the marriage. If both individuals do not consent, marriage cannot occur. The choice of marriage is whether or not each individual is willing to marry the other individual and it is in this choice that marriage is constructed.

The individual has the ability to choose who his or her marriage partner is if the partner also consents. In fact, an individual can choose not to enter into any marriage at all. This does not preclude the possibility of that individual's marriage, but recognizes that the individual has no one who he or she would consent to marrying and would also consent to marrying the individual. All people have the ability to make the choice of to marry another individual or not.

This in turn leads to the question of how can marriage be considered a right if it is centered on choice. A right is "legal or moral entitlement to do or refrain from doing something or to obtain or refrain from obtaining an action, thing or recognition in civil society" (Wikipedia). Marriage can only be a right if it is not a duty or a privilege. Because someone can choose never to marry, marriage is not a duty because it is not all individuals enter into it. It might appear that marriage could be considered a privilege as individuals are limited in who they can marry.

Marriage is commonly not allowed when one or both of the individuals is under the age of consent. The reason is that they are deemed to be incapable of consenting properly to the union of the two individuals because they lack the maturity and understanding to enter into such an agreement. In fact, the younger individual may be more easily coerced into marriage. Not allowing such a marriage to take place, is not a prescription against these two individuals ever from marrying, but from the individuals marrying when at least one of them is under aged. Both individuals may choose to marry each other at some point in the future. The older individual may even consent to marriage with another of age individual. So society is seen as revoking marriage when it is not able to receive the valid consent of both parties.

It would appear now that for marriage to be a privilege, it is based on the consent of each individual. The marriage in that example was not allowed because of the age and subsequently the inability of one of the individuals to consent to the union. However, the idea behind marriage is that each party consents. In the example, the under aged individual was unable to consent so the marriage could not occur. Indeed, if it had occurred it would not be marriage as it is intended because of the lack of proper consent. We find that society here is enforcing the importance of consent in a marriage and not restricting marriages as they are meant to be.

Another example of a time when marriage is not allowed is same sex marriage cannot. Here, the ability for two individuals to marry is revoked because each is of the same sex. Each of the individuals can validly consent to marrying the other, but the marriage is still refused because of the restriction of sex. What made a marriage valid is present but the marriage is not allowed. The reason for the prohibition is that the two individuals are of the same gender. If one individual was to change genders legally, then the marriage could occur. The same individuals would have consented as the only difference is the gender of one individual.

This analysis presents two possibilities. Marriage could be a privilege only offered to heterosexual couples or it could be a right denied to homosexual couples. Homosexuals exist as a class of citizens as they share a common orientation. This class of citizens is singled out without regard to the individuals. It is seen through the fact that the consent of each individual in a same sex couple may consent to marriage, but would be denied that possibility because of only their gender. The important facts surrounding each individual’s decision to get married is not considered. It would be little different form saying that individuals with a height difference of 6 inches, tattoos, or blue eyes could not marry. The individual is lost in the class making it discrimination.

In the United States, privileges do not legally exist through discriminating against a group. Privileges exist through earning them and are lost by abuse or misuse. One has the privilege to get a driver’s license, but will loss this privilege upon repeated DWI offenses. In removing a privilege, the individual is considered. To say that anyone who drinks is not allowed to have a driver’s license would be viewed as unjust. In denying the ability for two consenting same sex individuals from marrying because they are of the same gender, the right of marriage is doing exactly that. Not allowing same sex marriage is denying homosexuals their civil rights because of the class of citizens that they belong to.

Marriage is constituted of the conscious and valid consent of two individuals forming a union. What lies at the heart of marriage is consent as is shown by what marriages are and are not allowed. One problematic marriage that is not allowed is that between homosexuals. Valid and conscious consent is present here, but the marriage is not allowed because the individuals are of the same gender. The question of whether marriage is a right or a privilege is present in this prohibition. Marriage is denied to homosexual couples not because of the individuals they are and the quality of their consent, but the class of citizens to which they belong. Because the class is being singled out and not the individual this is considered discrimination and is not considered a revocation of a right to marriage. This claim is strengthened by the fact that each individual could marry a person with a different gender immediately after their marriage refusal and assuming shared consent would be allowed to. As such, marriage exists as a right present to all individuals who can consent valid and it is denied to homosexuals because of the homosexual nature of their relationship.

To Discriminate Against Homosexuality It Must be a Choice or Why Homosexuality's Origin is Debated and the Problems in the Argument

Homosexuality is considered by many to be fully natural. To prove this point, examples of homosexual behavior in nature are often cited because animals do not reason as we do. But if they do it, it cannot be considered wrong for humans to participate it. In fact, denying that certain humans are homosexual is denying part of nature and denying that we, humans, are another species on Earth. Different developmental studies are often cited that show that homosexuals and heterosexuals differ in genetics, prental neurohormonal levels, response to pheromones, and brain structures. These all attempt to show that the orientation is something that cannot be controlled or influenced by the environment. This acts to seperate behavior from disposition towards behavior. This is a valid approach however, bcause accepting one's determined orientation is to accept the behaviors that flow from this. I know I will recieve criticism from people citing criminal examples (e.g. someone predisposed to violence), but this question is not the purpose of this post so it holds little sway in the argument.

When people consider homosexuality to be unnatural, they focus on the behaviors associated with homosexuality, and completely ignore the underlying orientation. To back of this claim "ex-gays" are often cited as examples where someone partook in homosexual behaviors at one point, but through conversion therapy changed. Again, there are many criticisms of this fact, but it is not pertinent to the post. Additionally, this side states that homosexuality is against nature because it does not allow for reproduction and the passing on of genetic material to subsequent generations. As such, homosexuality is deemed to be unnatural.

The debate over the origins of homosexuality comes from the need to have a valid reason for discrimination or thinking less of homosexuals. The only valid reason for this would be that homosexuality is a conscious choice by the individual. The free will of the individual must play a role in their homosexual behaviors. If homosexuality is a conscious choice, then the act itself can be deemed to be moral or immoral and right or wrong. This distinction lies in contrast to an act being determined or coerced. If an outside source influences the actions of an individual, it becomes bery difficult to assign responsibility and impose limitations. Some examples of this are a man pulls your finger on the trigger of a gun and kills someone or you are attacked and killed a man in self defense. In either case, it is incredibly difficult to assign responsibility for the death of another to the individual because the individual lacked completely free will. By stating that homosexuality is a choice, the actions of a homosexual in same sex relations can be judged easily. In being able to judge the actions of a homosexual, rules and laws can be ethically passed that control them because they are solely based on the conscious choices made by the individual. Homosexuality becomes something little different than robbing a bank. The individual who robbed the bank chose to rob the bank. He was not forced or coerced, so is able to be held accountable by the law for the action. The homosexual chose his behaviors so can be restricted by law the same as another individual who has chosen a behavior deemed wrong by society.

If homosexuality was natural or fully determined it would be impossible to ethically pass laws restricting its practice, acceptance, or equality because the individuals would have no responsibility for their homosexuality and such, could not be held accountable for it. It would become something little different than passing laws against an individual because the individual's gender or race. An individuals gender or race is determined so cannot be discriminated against because the individual did not act freely to be that way. Additionally, any restriction on homosexuality would likewise not be ethical if homosexuality is natural because it would punish the individual for being different. Any restriction would act to restrict the individual's liberty to act out their nature, or imposing a restriction on the individual's free will (free will here in a Humian sense).

The question of whether or not homosexuality is natural is a question of whether or not it can be constricted like other conscious choices. Is homosexuality closer to race and gender or acting asocially through things like robbing a bank? By ignoring the orientation and focusing on the free will of the behavior, the people who view homosexuality as unnatural say that it can be restricted ethically. By looking at homosexuality as the determined orientation and the behavior as only a result of it, the people who view homosexuality as natural say that it cannot be restricted ethically.

To try to combine these two views makes the question rather difficult: behavior as a choice and orientation as determined. However, the conclsuion is one that would support the view that homosexuality cannot be restricted ethically. The orientation determines the individual's behavior. It is the innate attraction to homosexual or heterosexual partners that lead to the behaviors. Here, the behaviors become choices, but not freely determined choices. If an individual was forced to fire a gun and kill another individual, the individual is not held responsible for the death. Much in the same way, the orientation of the individual is forcing the behavior so the individual cannot be held responsible for the actions. In this light homosexuality behavior cannot be seen as a choice and so cannot be considered as the responsibility of the individual. So homosexuality should not be restricted or judged. Despite this, the behavior can be resisted, but resisting does not change the underlying nature of the individual. A homosexual does not have to engage in homosexual behaviors. However, he would still retain the homosexual orientation. But the choice here is not one that is truly and completely free. The individual can choose to resist his or her determined nature or to realize his or her determined nature. That is a choice up to the individual, but it is suggested that it is a forced choice and cannot be judged as harshly as other, completely free choices. The individual had no control over the events that led up to the necessity of the choice. Having to choose is a matter of situational or dispositional luck and therefore judgments on this have little to no moral responsibility. So, restrictions cannot be placed on the individual, whether he chooses to be a homosexual or a heterosexual behaviorally, because the necessity to make the decision to act or not act was out of the individuals control. So, in these two different conbinations, we see the same end results, the homosexual cannot be held accountable and responsible for his or her homosexual behaviors so cannot be restricted by the law.

Not Quite Related...

Though not quite related I always think how arguments with the religious right go. This is one of the best examples of arguing properly against those individuals. This article is one of the main reasons that Roe v. Wade supported abortion.


A Defense of Abortion
Judith Jarvis Thomson

Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 47 (1971)

{47} Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception. The premise is argued for, but, as I think, not well. Take, for example, the most common argument. We are asked to notice that the development of a human being from conception through birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a line, to choose a point in this development and say "before this point the thing is not a person, after this point it is a person" is to make an arbitrary choice, a choice for which in the nature of things no good reason can be given. It is concluded that the fetus is, or anyway that we had better say it is, a person from the moment of conception. But this conclusion does not follow. Similar things might be said about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow that acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say they are. Arguments of this form are sometimes called "slippery slope arguments"—the phrase is perhaps self-explanatory—and it is dismaying that opponents of abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically.

I am inclined to agree, however, that the prospects for "drawing a line" in the development of the fetus look dim. I am inclined to think also that we shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth. Indeed, it comes as a surprise when one first learns how early in its life it begins to acquire human characteristics. By the tenth week, for example, it already has a {48} face, arms, and legs, fingers and toes; it has internal organs, and brain activity is detectable.2 On the other hand, I think that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a person from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. But I shall not discuss any of this. For it seems to me to be of great interest to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, we allow the premise. How, precisely, are we supposed to get from there to the conclusion that abortion is morally impermissible? Opponents of abortion commonly spend most of their time establishing that the fetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from there to the impermissibility of abortion. Perhaps they think the step too simple and obvious to require much comment. Or perhaps instead they are simply being economical in argument. Many of those who defend abortion rely on the premise that the fetus is not a person, but only a bit of tissue that will become a person at birth; and why pay out more arguments than you have to? Whatever the explanation, I suggest that the step they take is neither easy nor obvious, that it calls for closer examination than it is commonly given, and that when we do give it this closer examination we shall feel inclined to reject it.

I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. How does the argument go from here? Something like this, I take it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.

It sounds plausible. but now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers {49} has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him." I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.

In this case, of course, you were kidnapped; you didn't volunteer for the operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can those who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for a pregnancy due to rape? Certainly. They can say that persons have a right to life only if they didn't come into existence because of rape; or they can say that all persons have a right to life, but that some have less of a right to life than others, in particular, that those who came into existence because of rape have less. But these statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the question of whether you have a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldn't turn on the question of whether or not you are the product of a rape. And in fact the people who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned do not make this distinction, and hence do not make an exception in case of rape. {50}

Nor do they make an exception for a case in which the mother has to spend the nine months of her pregnancy in bed. They would agree that would be a pity, and hard on the mother; but all the same, all persons have a right to life, the fetus is a person, and so on. I suspect, in fact, that they would not make an exception for a case in which, miraculously enough, the pregnancy went on for nine years, or even the rest of the mother's life.

Some won't even make an exception for a case in which continuation of the pregnancy is likely to shorten the mother's life; they regard abortion as impermissible even to save the mother's life. Such cases are nowadays very rare, and many opponents of abortion do not accept this extreme view. All the same, it is a good place to begin: a number of points of interest come out in respect to it.

1. Let us call the view that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother's life "the extreme view." I want to suggest first that it does not issue from the argument I mentioned earlier without the addition of some fairly powerful premises. Suppose a woman has become pregnant, and now learns that she has a cardiac condition such that she will die if she carries the baby to term. What may be done for her? The fetus, being a person, has a right to life, but as the mother is a person too, so has she a right to life. Presumably they have an equal right to life. How is it supposed to come out that an abortion may not be performed? If mother and child have an equal right to life, shouldn't we perhaps flip a coin? Or should we add to the mother's right to life her right to decide what happens in and to her body, which everybody seems to be ready to grant—the sum of her rights now outweighing the fetus' right to life?

The most familiar argument here is the following. We are told that performing the abortion would be directly killing3 the child, whereas doing nothing would not be killing the mother, but only letting her die. Moreover, in killing the child, one would be killing an innocent person, for the child has committed no crime, and is not aiming at his mother's death. And then there are a variety of ways in which this {51} might be continued. (1) But as directly killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (2) as directly killing an innocent person is murder, and murder is always and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be performed.4 Or (3) as one's duty to refrain from directly killing an innocent person is more stringent than one's duty to keep a person from dying, an abortion may not be performed. Or, (4) if one's only options are directly killing an innocent person or letting a person die, one must prefer letting the person die, and thus an abortion may not be performed.5

Some people seem to have thought that these are not further premises which must be added if the conclusion is to be reached, but that they follow from the very fact that an innocent person has a right to life.6 But this seems to me to be a mistake, and perhaps the simplest way to show this is to bring out that while we must certainly grant that innocent persons have a right to life, the theses in (1) through (4) are all false. Take (2), for example. If directly killing an innocent person is murder, and thus impermissible, then the mother's directly killing the innocent person inside her is murder, and thus is {52} impermissible. But it cannot seriously be thought to be murder if the mother performs an abortion on herself to save her life. It cannot seriously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit passively by and wait for her death. Let us look again at the case of you and the violinist. There you are, in bed with the violinist, and the director of the hospital says to you, "It's all most distressing, and I deeply sympathize, but you see this is putting an additional strain on your kidneys, and you'll be dead within the month. But you have to stay where you are all the same. Because unplugging you would be directly killing an innocent violinist, and that's murder, and that's impermissible." If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself from that violinist to save your life.

The main focus of attention in writings on abortion has been on what a third party may or may not do in answer to a request from a woman for an abortion. This is in a way understandable. Things being as they are, there isn't much a woman can safely do to abort herself. So the question asked is what a third party may do, and what the mother may do, if it is mentioned at all, is deduced, almost as an afterthought, from what it is concluded that third parties may do. But it seems to me that to treat the matter in this way is to refuse to grant to the mother that very status of person which is so firmly insisted on for the fetus. For we cannot simply read off what a person may do from what a third party may do. Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child—you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man. Now I could well understand it if a bystander were to say, "There's nothing we can do for you. We cannot choose between your life and his, we cannot be the ones to decide who is to live, we cannot intervene." But it cannot be concluded that you too can do nothing, that you cannot attack it to save your life. However innocent the child may be, you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death. Perhaps a pregnant woman is vaguely felt to have the status of house, to which we don't allow the {53} right of self defense. But if the woman houses the child, it should be remembered that she is a person who houses it.

I should perhaps stop to say explicitly that I am not claiming that people have a right to do anything whatever to save their lives. I think, rather, that there are drastic limits to the right of self-defense. If someone threatens you with death unless you torture someone else to death, I think you have not the right, even to save your life, to do so. But the case under consideration here is very different. In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can.

In sum, a woman surely can defend her life against the threat to it posed by the unborn child, even if doing so involves its death. And this shows not merely that the theses in (1) through (4) are false; it shows also that the extreme view of abortion is false, and so we need not canvass any other possible ways of arriving at it from the argument I mentioned at the outset.

2. The extreme view could of course be weakened to say that while abortion is permissible to save the mother's life, it may not be performed by a third party, but only by the mother herself. But this cannot be right either. For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house which has, by an unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing. Certainly it lets us see that a third party who cays "I cannot choose between you" is fooling himself if he things this is impartiality. If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says "I cannot choose between you" when Smith owns the coat. Women have said again and again "This body is my body!" and they have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has been like shouting into the wind. Smith, after all, is {54} hardly likely to bless us if we say to him, "Of course it's your coat, anybody would grant that it is. But no one may choose between you and Jones who is to have it."

We should really ask what it is that says "no one may choose" in the face of the fact that the body that houses the child is the mother's body. It may be simply a failure to appreciate this fact. But it may be something more interesting, namely the sense that one has a right to refuse to lay hands on people, even where it would be just and fair to do so, even where justice seems to require that somebody do so. Thus justice might call for somebody to get Smith's coat back from Jones, and yet you have a right to refuse to be the one to lay hands on Jones, a right to refuse to do physical violence to him. This, I think, must be granted. But then what should be said is not "no one may choose," but only "I cannot choose," and indeed not even this, but "I will not act," leaving it open that somebody else can or should, and in particular that anyone in a position of authority, with the job of securing people's rights, both can and should. So this is no difficulty. I have not been arguing that any given third party must accede to the mother's request that he perform an abortion to save her life, but only that he may.

I suppose that in some views of human life the mother's body is only on loan to her, the loan not being one which gives her any prior claim to it. One who held this view might well think it impartiality to say "I cannot choose." But I shall simply ignore this possibility. My own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body. And perhaps this needn't be argued for here anyway, since, as I mentioned, the arguments against abortion we are looking at do grant that the woman has a right to decide what happens in and to her body.

But although they do grant it, I have tired to show that they do not take seriously what is done in granting it. I suggest the same thing will reappear even more clearly when we turn away from cases in which the mother's life is at stake, and attend, as I propose we now do, to the vastly more common cases in which a woman wants an abortion for some less weighty reason than preserving her own life.

3. Where the mother's life is not at stake, the argument I mentioned at the outset seems to have a much stronger pull. "Everyone {55} has a right to life, so the unborn person has a right to life." And isn't the child's right to life weightier than anything other than the mother's own right to life, which she might put forward as ground for an abortion?

This argument treats the right to life as if it were unproblematic. It is not, as this seems to me to be precisely the source of the mistake.

For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a right to life. In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has no right at all to be given? If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt well meant, if my friends flew out to the West Coast and carried Henry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me. Or again, to return to the story I told earlier, the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the continued use of your kidneys does not establish that he has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys. He certainly has no right against you that you should give him continued use of your kidneys. For nobody has any right to use your kidneys unless you give him such a right; and nobody has the right against you that you shall give him this right—if you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due. Nor has he any right against anybody else that they should give him continued use of your kidneys. Certainly he had no right against the Society of Music Lovers that they should plug him into you in the first place. And if you now start to unplug yourself, having learned that you will otherwise have to spend nine years in bed with him, there is nobody in the world who must try to prevent you, in order to see that he is given something he has a right to be given.

Some people are rather stricter about the right to life. In their view, it does not include the right to be given anything, but amounts to, {56} and only to, the right not to be killed by anybody. But here a related difficulty arises. If everybody is to refrain from killing that violinist, then everybody must refrain from doing a great many different sorts of things. Everybody must refrain from slitting his throat, everybody must refrain from shooting him—and everybody must refrain from unplugging you from him. But does he have a right against everybody that they shall refrain from unplugging you from him? To refrain from doing this is to allow him to continue to use your kidneys. It could be argued that he has a right against us that we should allow him to continue to use your kidneys. That is, while he had no right against us that we should give him the use of your kidneys, it might be argued that he anyway has a right against us that we shall not now intervene and deprive him of the use of your kidneys. I shall come back to third-party interventions later. But certainly the violinist has no right against you that you shall allow him to continue to use your kidneys. As I said, if you do allow him to use them, it is a kindess on your part, and not something you owe him.

The difficulty I point to here is not peculiar to the right to life. It reappears in connection with all other natural rights; and it is something which an adequate account of rights must deal with. For present purposes it is enough just to draw attention to it. But I would stress that I am not arguing that people do not have a right to life—quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the primary control we must place on the acceptability of an account of rights is that it should turn out in that account to be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body—even if one needs it for life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents of abortion in the very simple and clear way in which they seem to have thought it would.

4. There is another way to bring out the difficulty. In the most ordinary sort of case, to deprive someone of what he has a right to is to treat him unjustly. Suppose a boy and his small brother are jointly given a box of chocolates for Christmas. If the older boy takes the box and refuses to give his brother any of the chocolates, he is unjust to him, for the brother has been given a right to half of them. But {57} suppose that, having learned that otherwise it means nine years in bed with that violinist, you unplug yourself from him. You surely are not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right. But we have to notice that in unplugging yourself, you are killing him; and violinists, like everybody else, have a right to life, and thus in the view we were considering just now, the right not to be killed. So here you do what he supposedly has a right you shall not do, but you do not act unjustly to him in doing it.

The emendation which may be made at this point is this: the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly. This runs a risk of circularity, but never mind: it would enable us to square the fact that the violinist has a right to life with the fact that you do not act unjustly toward him in unplugging yourself, thereby killing him. For if you do not kill him unjustly, you do not violate his right to life, and so it is no wonder you do him no injustice.

But if this emendation is accepted, the gap in the argument against abortion stares us plainly in the face: it is by no means enough to show that the fetus is a person, and to remind us that all persons have a right to life—we need to be shown also that killing the fetus violates its right to life, i.e., that abortion is unjust killing. And is it?

I suppose we may take it as a datum that in a case of pregnancy due to rape the mother has not given the unborn person a right to the use of her body for food and shelter. Indeed, in what pregnancy could it be supposed that the mother has given the unborn person such a right? It is not as if there were unborn persons drifting about the world, to whom a woman who wants a child says "I invite you in."

But it might be argued that there are other ways one can have acquired a right to the use of another person's body than by having been invited to use it by that person. Suppose a woman voluntarily indulges in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant; is she not in part responsible for the presence, in fact the very existence, of the unborn person inside her? No doubt she did not invite it in. But doesn't her partial responsibility for its being there itself give it a right to the use of her {58} body?7 If so, then her aborting it would be more like the boy's taking away the chocolates, and less like your unplugging yourself from the violinist—doing so would be depriving it of what it does have a right to, and thus would be doing it an injustice.

And then, too, it might be asked whether or not she can kill it even to save her own life: if she voluntarily called it into existence, how can she now kill it, even in self-defense?

The first thing to be said about this is that it is something new. Opponents of abortion have been so concerned to make out the independence of the fetus, in order to establish that it has a right to life, just as its mother does, that they have tended to overlook the possible support they might gain from making out that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to establish that she has a special kind of responsibility for it, a responsibility that gives it rights against her which are not possessed by any independent person—such as an ailing violinist who is a stranger to her.

On the other hand, this argument would give the unborn person a right to its mother's body only if her pregnancy resulted from a voluntary act, undertaken in full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result from it. It would leave out entirely the unborn person whose existence is due to rape. Pending the availability of some further argument, then, we would be left with the conclusion that unborn persons whose existence is due to rape have no right to the use of their mothers' bodies, and thus that aborting them is not depriving them of anything they have a right to and hence is not unjust killing.

And we should also notice that it is not at all plain that this argument really does go even as far as it purports to. For there are cases and cases, and the details make a difference. If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would it be absurd to say, "Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a right to the use of her house—for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars {59} burgle." It would be still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in. Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As it happens, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not—despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't do—for by the same token anyone can avoid pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without a (reliable!) army.

It seems to me that the argument we are looking at can establish at most that there are some cases in which the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother's body, and therefore some cases in which abortion is unjust killing. There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, if any. But I think we should sidestep this issue and leave it open, for at any rate the argument certainly does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing.

5. There is room for yet another argument here, however. We surely must grant that there may be cases in which it would be morally indecent to detach a person from your body at the cost of his life. Suppose you learn that what the violinist needs is not nine years of your life, but only one hour: all you need do to save his life is to spend one hour in that bed with him. Suppose also that letting him use your kidneys for that one hour would not affect your health in the slightest. Admittedly you were kidnapped. Admittedly you did not give {60} anyone permission to plug him into you. Nevertheless it seems to me plain you ought to allow him to use your kidneys for that hour—it would be indecent to refuse.

Again, suppose pregnancy lasted only an hour, and constituted no threat to life or health. And suppose that a woman becomes pregnant as a result of rape. Admittedly she did not voluntarily do anything to bring about the existence of a child. Admittedly she did nothing at all which would give the unborn person a right to the use of her body. All the same it might well be said, as in the newly emended violinist story, that she ought to allow it to remain for that hour—that it would be indecent in her to refuse.

Now some people are inclined to use the term "right" in such a way that it follows from the fact that you ought to allow a person to use your body for the hour he needs, that he has a right to use your body for the hour he needs, even though he has not been given that right by any person or act. They may say that it follows also that if you refuse, you act unjustly toward him. This use of the term is perhaps so common that it cannot be called wrong; nevertheless it seems to me to be an unfortunate loosening of what we would do better to keep a tight rein on. Suppose that box of chocolates I mentioned earlier had not been given to both boys jointly, but was given only to the older boy. There he sits, stolidly eating his way through the box, his small brother watching enviously. Here we are likely to say "You ought not to be so mean. You ought to give your brother some of those chocolates." My own view is that it just does not follow from the truth of this that the brother has any right to any of the chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is greedy, stingy, callous—but not unjust. I suppose that the people I have in mind will say it does follow that the brother has a right to some of the chocolates, and thus that the boy does act unjustly if he refuses to give his brother any. But the effect of saying this is to obscure what we should keep distinct, namely the difference between the boy's refusal in this case and the boy's refusal in the earlier case, in which the box was given to both boys jointly, and in which the small brother thus had what was from any point of view clear title to half.

A further objection to so using the term "right" that from the fact that A ought to do a thing for B, it follows that B has a right against A {61} that A do it for him, is that it is going to make the question of whether or not a man has a right to a thing turn on how easy it is to provide him with it; and this seems not merely unfortunate, but morally unacceptable. Take the case of Henry Fonda again. I said earlier that I had no right to the touch of his cool hand on my fevered brow, even though I needed it to save my life. I said it would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide me with it, but that I had no right against him that he should do so. But suppose he isn't on the West Coast. Suppose he has only to walk across the room, place a hand briefly on my brow—and lo, my life is saved. Then surely he ought to do it, it would be indecent to refuse. Is it to be said "Ah, well, it follows that in this case she has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so it would be an injustice in him to refuse"? So that I have a right to it when it is easy for him to provide it, though no right when it's hard? It's rather a shocking idea that anyone's rights should fade away and disappear as it gets harder and harder to accord them to him.

So my own view is that even though you ought to let the violinist use your kidneys for the one hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so—we should say that if you refuse, you are, like the boy who owns all the chocolates and will give none away, self-centered and callous, indecent in fact, but not unjust. And similarly, that even supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so; we should conclude that she is self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. The complaints are no less grave, they are just different. However, there is no need to insist on this point. If anyone does wish to deduce "he has a right" from "you ought," then all the same he must surely grant that there are cases in which it is not morally required of you that you allow that violinist to use your kidneys, and in which he does not have a right to use them, and in which you do not do him an injustice if you refuse. And so also for mother and unborn child. Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right to demand it—and we were leaving open the possibility that there may be such cases—nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other interests and concerns, of all other duties {62} and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in order to keep another person alive.

6. We have in fact to distinguish between two kinds of Samaritan: the Good Samaritan and what we might call the Minimally Decent Samaritan. The story of the Good Samaritan, you will remember, goes like this:

A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.

And by chance there came down a certain priest that way; and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side.

And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side.

But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when he saw him he had compassion on him.

And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him.

And on the morrow, when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, "Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee."

(Luke 10:30-35)

The Good Samaritan went out of his way, at some cost to himself, to help one in need of it. We are not told what the options were, that is, whether or not the priest and the Levite could have helped by doing less than the Good Samaritan did, but assuming they could have, then the fact they did nothing at all shows they were not even Minimally Decent Samaritans, not because they were not Samaritans, but because they were not even minimally decent.

These things are a matter of degree, of course, but there is a difference, and it comes out perhaps most clearly in the story of Kitty Genovese, who, as you will remember, was murdered while thirty-eight people watched or listened, and did nothing at all to help her. A Good Samaritan would have rushed out to give direct assistance {63} against the murderer. Or perhaps we had better allow that it would have been a Splendid Samaritan who did this, on the ground that it would have involved a risk of death for himself. But the thirty-eight not only did not do this, they did not even trouble to pick up a phone to call the police. Minimally Decent Samaritanism would call for doing at least that, and their not having done it was monstrous.

After telling the story of the Good Samaritan, Jesus said "Go, and do thou likewise." Perhaps he meant that we are morally required to act as the Good Samaritan did. Perhaps he was urging people to do more than is morally required of them. At all events it seems plain that it was not morally required of any of the thirty-eight that he rush out to give direct assistance at the risk of his own life, and that it is not morally required of anyone that he give long stretches of his life—nine years or nine months—to sustaining the life of a person who has no special right (we are leaving open the possibility of this) to demand it.

Indeed, with one rather striking class of exceptions, no one in any country in the world is legally required to do anywhere near as much as this for anyone else. The class of exceptions is obvious. My main concern here is not the sate of the law in respect to abortion, but it is worth drawing attention to the fact that in no state in this country is any man compelled by law to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan to any person; there is no law under which charges could be brought against the thirty-eight who stood by while Kitty Genovese died. By contrast, in most states in this country women are compelled by law to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside them. This doesn't by itself settle anything one way or the other, because it may well be argued that there should be laws in this country—as there are in many European countries—compelling at least Minimally Decent Samaritanism.8 But it does show that there is a gross injustice in the existing state of the law. And it shows also that the groups currently working against liberalization of abortion laws, in fact working toward having it declared unconstitu-{64}tional for a state to permit abortion, had better start working for the adoption of Good Samaritan laws generally, or earn the charge that they are acting in bad faith.

I should think, myself, that Minimally Decent Samaritan laws would be one thing, Good Samaritan laws quite another, and in fact highly improper. But we are not here concerned with the law. What we should ask is not whether anybody should be compelled by law to be a Good Samaritan, but whether we must accede to a situation in which somebody is being compelled—by nature, perhaps—to be a Good Samaritan. We have, in other words, to look now at third-party interventions. I have been arguing that no person is morally required to make large sacrifices to sustain the life of another who has no right to demand them, and this even where the sacrifices do not include life itself; we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans or anyway Very Good Samaritans to one another. But what if a man cannot extricate himself from such a situation? What if he appeals to us to extricate him? It seems to me plain that there are cases in which we can, cases in which a Good Samaritan would extricate him. There you are, you were kidnapped, and nine years in bed with that violinist lie ahead of you. You have your own life to lead. You are sorry, but you simply cannot see giving up so much of your life to the sustaining of his. You cannot extricate yourself, and ask us to do so. I should have thought that—in light of his having no right to the use of your body—it was obvious that we do not have to accede to your being forced to give up so much. We can do what you ask. There is no injustice to the violinist in our doing so.

7. Following the lead of the opponents of abortion, I have throughout been speaking of the fetus merely as a person, and what I have been asking is whether or not the argument we began with, which proceeds only from the fetus being a person, really does establish its conclusion. I have argued that it does not.

But of course there are arguments and arguments, and it may be said that I have simply fastened on the wrong one. It may be said that what is important is not merely the fact that the fetus is a person, but that it is a person for whom the woman has a special kind of responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its mother. And it might be argued that all my analogies are therefore irrelevant—for you do {65} not have that special kind of responsibility for that violinist, Henry Fonda does not have that special kind of responsibility for me. And our attention might be drawn to the fact that men and women both are compelled by law to provide support for their children.

I have in effect dealt (briefly) with this argument in section 4 above; but a (still briefer) recapitulation now may be in order. Surely we do not have any such "special responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it. But if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it. They may wish to assume responsibility for it, or they may not wish to. And I am suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would require large sacrifices, then they may refuse. A Good Samaritan would not refuse—or anyway, a Splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifices that had to be made were enormous. But then so would a Good Samaritan assume responsibility for that violinist; so would Henry Fonda, if he is a Good Samaritan, fly in from the West Coast and assume responsibility for me.

8. My argument will be found unsatisfactory on two counts by many of those who want to regard abortion as morally permissible. First, while I do argue that abortion is not impermissible, I do not argue that it is always permissible. There may well be cases in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother, and this is a standard we must not fall below. I am inclined to think it a merit of my account precisely that it does not give a general yes or a general no. It allows for and supports our sense that, for example, a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may of course choose abortion, and that any law which rules this out is an insane law. And it also allows for and supports our sense that in other cases resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in the woman to request an {66} abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad. The very fact that the arguments I have been drawing attention to treat all cases of abortion, or even all cases of abortion in which the mother's life is not at stake, as morally on a par ought to have made them suspect at the outset.

Secondly, while I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to survive outside the mother's body; hence removing it from her body guarantees its death. But they are importantly different. I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist; but to say this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn round and slit his throat. You may detach yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill him. There are some people who will feel dissatisfied by this feature of my argument. A woman may be utterly devastated by the thought of a child, a bit of herself, put out for adoption and never seen or heard of again. She may therefore want not merely that the child be detached from her, but more, that it die. Some opponents of abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt—thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of despair. All the same, I agree that the desire for the child's death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive.

At this place, however, it should be remembered that we have only been pretending throughout that the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception. A very early abortion is surely not the killing of a person, and so is not dealt with by anything I have said here.

Five years of gay marriage in Netherlands

English > Current Affairs

Five years of gay marriage by Sebastiaan Gottlieb

03-04-2006

It's exactly five years this month since the first gay and lesbian weddings were allowed in the Netherlands. At the time, this was the only country in the world where it was possible for gay couples to marry. On the day itself, 1 April 2001, the international media flocked to the event and just after midnight, surrounded by their friends and families, Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen conducted the marriage of four couples, three gay and one lesbian.

"If I had known that the marriage would attract such an enormous amount of attention, I would never have agreed to be the first to marry", says Anne Marie Thus five years later in her home in Amsterdam's Osdorp district. "When we arrived from our hotel and found this huge number of satellite vans from the international media, I was really shocked. Fortunately, we found our families among the crowd of journalists, which gave us a sense of comfort. It was overwhelming, but also beautiful: the city hall was decorated with roses and Mayor Job Cohen gave a lovely speech."

Registered partnerships
Since the Netherlands made it legal for marriage contracts between homosexual partners, two other European countries have followed suit: Belgium and Spain. Outside of Europe, gay and lesbian couples can marry in Canada and in the US state of Massachusetts.

South Africa will probably introduce same-sex marriage this year. About 30 countries in the world recognise the so-called 'registered partnership', which is different from marriage in that it does not automatically give both partners parental rights over children.

Rush to marry
During the first year, no fewer than 2414 gay and lesbian couples married in the Netherlands. According to Marian Baker of the International Homosexual/Lesbian Information Centre and Archive (IHLIA), there was already a large group of couples that had wanted to marry before the legislation was brought in. After the law was changed, the rate of same-sex marriages stabilised to around 1200 per year.



Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen conducted the first gay marriages

Gay divorcee
Homosexuals marry less often than heterosexuals, according to Jan Latten of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). This is believed to be because they have children less often than straight couples. The divorce rate, though, is the same as that of heterosexuals, but lesbians divorce more often than gay men.

Anne Marie Thus, one of the first lesbians to marry, has since given birth to two children from an unknown donor father. "The difference with a heterosexual marriage is that my wife does not have the same rights as the father, who can confirm the child as his at the city hall. This is the only remaining part of Dutch family law where women do not have the same rights.
It took three years before my wife could adopt our child, which legally makes her the mother. Homosexuals are also not able to adopt children as a couple; only one of the two can do this individually." Anne Marie Thus has established a website called "more than wanted" in order to get this last remaining distinction between homosexuals and heterosexuals removed from the law.

Still not equal
In the past five years, gay marriage has become accepted almost everywhere in the Netherlands. Problems still happen, though, when gay people who married here want to live or work abroad. Because their marriage is not often recognised in other countries, they are sometimes unable to get a residence or work permit. The emancipation of gay people is not yet complete, but recognition of same-sex marriage in the Netherlands has been a giant leap towards it.